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Continuities in the Formation of  
Russian Political Elites 
Elena Semenova  
Abstract: »Kontinuitäten der Elitenbildung der politischen Elite in Russland«. 
The article investigates continuities in the formation and careers of political 
elites in post-Soviet Russia. Data on the recruitment and careers of MPs (from 
1993 until 2003), cabinet ministers (1991 until 2011) and governors (from 
1991 until 2011) were used. We identified a partial reproduction of the politi-
cal elite which may be defined as reproduction circulation. The first form is 
structural reproduction that is evident in continuities of the socio-demographic 
profile of political elites. The second-strongest form of path dependency is 
functional reproduction that was found in career paths of political elites. Fi-
nally, individual reproduction was prominent. This reproduction should de-
crease over time, while functional and structural reproduction are likely to re-
main. 
Keywords: nomenklatura, parliament, cabinet, governor, elite, path depend-
ency. 
 
For many, the end of the 1980s symbolised the beginning of the new era. Po-
litical, economical, and social changes took place in virtually all member coun-
tries of the Soviet Union, although with different magnitudes. During the later 
years of the Soviet Union, the careers of many political elites, i.e., members of 
the privileged nomenklatura system, met an abrupt end. 
Conflicts between orthodox and moderate Communists resulted in the at-
tempted coup d’etat of 1991 and the bloody shootings at the White House (i.e. 
the seat of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Repub-
lic) in 1993. The first president of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, who 
belonged to the moderate wing of the Communist Party, substantially changed 
the composition of political elites by appointing loyal candidates to different 
positions at the national and regional levels. The turnover of political elites in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s raised many questions regarding the conse-
quences of these actions. How ‘new’ was the new political elite of post-Soviet 
Russia? Did it include many novices or was it just “an old wine in a new bot-
tle” (Hanley et al. 1995)? Moreover, did the selection principles for elite posi-
tions change upon the introduction of multi-party and competitive elections? 
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Theoretically, the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union on the 
fate of political elites may be explained through path dependency theory. The 
path dependency approach traces current developments back to previous deci-
sions and underlines the crucial importance of the initial situation on further 
development (Pierson 2000). According to this approach, an established path 
holds an advantage over other alternatives and can be reinforced through in-
creasing returns, i.e., positive feedback processes (Mahoney 2000). Therefore, 
the relative benefits of the chosen path increase over time and make it difficult 
to reverse the path of development. 
When applying this approach to elite formation in post-Soviet Russia, path 
dependency to the Soviet era is expected. We might expect two main forms of 
path dependency: the first is a simple large-scale reproduction of elites and the 
creation of a quasi-nomenklatura system of elite selection. The second is partial 
reproduction of elites and selection principles. It is important to underline that 
the path dependency approach, with its self-reinforcing aspects, is difficult to 
directly apply to Russia because institutional persistence was not provided. To 
test these hypotheses, data on the recruitment and careers of MPs (from 1993 
until 2003), cabinet ministers (1991 until 2011) and governors (from 1991 until 
2011) were used. 
The article consists of three parts. In the first, continuities in the formation 
of political elites in Russia are analysed with regard to the socio-demographic 
profile of elite members. The second part discusses the survival of Soviet poli-
ticians in post-Soviet Russia. The third part deals with the continuities of career 
paths. 
Structural Continuities in the Formation  
of Political Elites in Russia 
Female Representation: Politics is a Male-Oriented Profession 
The overrepresentation of men was a feature of Soviet politics. In the 1925 
Congress of People’s Deputies, there were only three women among the 106 
members elected to the Central Committee of the Communist Party (CC). Dur-
ing the early Soviet years, females were also underrepresented among Congress 
delegates who participated in the CC elections (Mawdsley and White 2000, 
244). Only 4% of political elites recruited after the Purges (1938-1953) were 
female, which was an increase of approximately 1% compared to the elites 
recruited in the early Stalin period. However, “it was as high as this only be-
cause a number of women, exemplary dairymaids and the like, were co-opted 
onto the CC; they were ‘token members’” (Mawdsley and White 2000, 109). 
Females represented the minority of rank-and-file members. This proportion 
declined from 16.5% in 1934 to 14.5% in 1939, then increased to almost 20% 
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in 1952 and remained stable during the 1950s and 1960s (Rigby 1968, 360-
361). The policy of recruiting ‘token’ females continued under Khrushchev. 
Although there were 11 women in the CC under Khrushchev (1953-64), they 
were not appointed to leading positions and only rarely to the Politburo. The 
only female member, Yekaterina Furtseva, left the Politburo in 1961. 
Under Brezhnev’s rule, 4% of leading Party positions were held by women, 
while 26.5% of the party rank-and-file members were female (Mawdsley and 
White 2000, 172). Gorbachev’s perestroika sought for the advancement of 
females as an important step towards the transformation of the Soviet regime. 
This policy resulted in the recruitment of 33 women to the 1990 CC, thereby 
increasing the proportion of females to 8%. Moreover, female representation in 
the Politburo and Secretariat increased (Lentini 1993), and the proportion of 
females among rank-and-file members increased to 30% (Mawdsley and White 
2000, 206, 253). In 1984, one third of the members of the 11th Supreme Soviet 
were women, but this proportion declined to 16% in 1989 and to only 6% in 
1990 after the Supreme Soviet quota for female members was abolished. In 
general, over the entire Soviet period, females comprised only 5% of all CC 
members. The same proportion of women was recruited to the Secretariat of 
the Communist Party, while females represented only 2% of Politburo mem-
bers (Mawdsley and White 2000, 255). 
The post-Soviet political system was not any more female-friendly than that 
of the Soviet Union. Only 6.7% of the 1993 elite were women (Hanley et al. 
1995, 653). The proportion of female MPs averaged only 11.6% across the six 
parliaments; furthermore, this is below the European and world averages 
(Palmieri 2011). In the sixth parliament elected in 2011, the proportion of fe-
male MPs was on par with that of the first parliament (13.7 and 13.6% respec-
tively). According to comparative data on female MPs compiled by the Inter-
Parliamentary Union (IPU 2011), the Russian parliament ranked 91st of 143 
parliaments in this respect, situated between Djibouti (13.8%) and Grenada, 
Guatemala and Niger (13.3%). 
There was also a pronounced absence of women in ministerial positions 
throughout the Soviet period. There was only one female minister in the first 
Soviet government (1917-1922), and only two women were appointed between 
1923 and 1991 (Kochkina 1999). In Russian cabinets, women held 16 of 491 
ministerial posts between 1991-2012, with only nine women accounting for all 
16 posts. In the 20 years after the collapse of Communism, only one woman, 
Valentina Matvienko, has held a top leadership position – Vice Prime Minister. 
Another female minister, Elvira Nabiullina, was appointed as Minister of Eco-
nomic Development in 2007. When appointed to the cabinet, women in Russia 
usually received health, culture, social affairs, or agriculture portfolios. The 
representation of females at the regional level was even worse than in the cabi-
net. From 1991 until 2010, there were 333 governors in all Russian regions 
(including 38 interim governors), but only four have been women. 
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The representation of females and the dynamics of their recruitment reveal 
three main continuities in the elite formation: first, women are still massively 
underrepresented in all elite subgroups. Second, high-ranking executive posi-
tions are particularly male-dominated, as was the case with cabinet and guber-
natorial positions. Third, the formation of parliamentary elites followed the 
Soviet tradition of ‘token’ recruitment. Only a small proportion of women that 
had been recruited obtained a leading position in the parliament (e.g., a chair or 
vice-chair of a committee). Since 1993, the only example has been Lubov 
Sliska (“United Russia” parliamentary party group), who was a Deputy 
Speaker of the State Duma. 
The underrepresentation of females in Russian politics may be explained by 
many factors: first, the attitudes of political parties toward female candidates 
are rather negative (Golosov 2001). Parties often refused to place female can-
didates in prominent positions on electoral lists. Female-oriented parties (e.g., 
“Women of Russia”) were active and successful during the first years of post-
Soviet Russia but suffered a dramatic defeat in the second elections and disap-
peared by 1999. Second, women who sought election to parliament had better 
chances of success when they stood in single-member districts (Moser 2001), 
which contradicted the common expectation that women are more successful if 
nominated via party lists. Third, the “United Russia” party pledged to increase 
female representation but largely nominated female celebrities such as athletes, 
actresses, and even a ballerina. These recruitment features again underlined the 
‘token’ element in elite formation. Finally, traditional gender-role perceptions 
and the widespread attitude that politics is a male domain were also important 
factors that hindered the political activism of women (Anker 1998; Millar and 
Wolchik 1994). The most recent example of these traditional attitudes was 
provided by former Prime Minister Vladimir Putin during the International 
Female Forum, which took place in November 2011 in Russia. When deputy of 
the State Duma, Svetlana Zhurova, remarked that many employers prefer males 
because they think it is easier to work with men, Putin answered that this was 
not just a thought, but reality. 
Ethnic Minority Representation: Russian-Dominated Elites 
Females are not the only historically disadvantaged social group. Although the 
Soviet Union was multinational, political leadership was in the hands of Rus-
sians who were overrepresented in the CC. Over the entire Soviet period, 77% 
of the Secretariat members and 60% of the Politburo were Russians (Mawdsley 
and White 2000, 255). The Ukrainians, the second-largest group, accounted for 
12% of the CC members, 9% of the Politburo, and 8% of the Secretariat. Inter-
estingly, both Russians and Ukrainians were underrepresented in the CC com-
pared to their share among rank-and-file party members (Mawdsley and White 
2000, 255-56). 
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The representation of ethnic minorities was clearly a distinctive feature of 
elite structure until the mid-1930s. The elites under Lenin were ethnically di-
verse; Russians accounted for 52% of all CC members, and Jews for approxi-
mately 17% (Mawdsley and White 2000, 15, 54). Both Jews and Ukrainians 
were overrepresented in the CC compared to their share among rank-and-file 
members. In 1922, Jews and Ukrainians made up 5 and 6% of the membership 
respectively, while Russians accounted for 72% of party members (Mawdsley 
and White 2000, 15; Rigby 1968, 366). After Lenin’s death, the proportion of 
Russians among the CC elites increased from 52 to 58%, while Jews accounted 
for 15% (Mawdsley and White 2000, 54). The period from 1917 until 1934 was 
characterised by maximum representation of minorities among the Soviet top 
elites. “Never again would the minorities have such influence, either in the top 
leadership or at the level of the Central Committee” (Mawdsley and White 
2000, 54). 
The Purges of 1936-38, initiated by Joseph Stalin, resulted in increased rep-
resentation of Russians among the CC elites. The proportion of Russians 
reached 73% in 1951 and declined to 67% after Stalin’s death (Mawdsley and 
White 2000, 108). In contrast, there was a massive decrease in the recruitment 
of Jews to CC elite positions; they accounted for only 1% of the post-Stalin 
elite (Mawdsley and White 2000, 109). After the Purges, the proportion of 
Ukrainians in the CC was higher than their proportion among rank-and-file 
members and the general population (Mawdsley and White 2000, 250). 
Under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, Ukrainians were particularly well-
represented (Mawdsley and White 2000, 175). In contrast, the proportion of 
Russians among the CC elites fell from 67% in 1954 to 64% in 1961 (Mawd-
sley and White 2000, 141). The representation of Baltic nationalities also de-
clined during Brezhnev’s rule. In addition, ethnic minorities living in Russia 
were insufficiently represented in the CC over the entire Soviet period (Mawd-
sley and White 2000, 176). 
Finally, during the Gorbachev period, the ethnic structure of the CC corre-
sponded to that of the party members and the general population (Mawdsley 
and White 2000, 253). The proportion of Russians among the CC elites de-
clined from 64% in 1961 to 52% in 1990, while their respective share among 
the party rank-and-file members was approximately 58%. In contrast, the pro-
portion of Ukrainians increased to 12.3% of CC members, while Belorussians 
and Baltic nations accounted for 5 and 3% of CC members respectively 
(Mawdsley and White 2000, 206). 
Over the four post-Soviet legislative terms, the proportion of Russians in the 
parliament was as high as 78%, fluctuating between 81% in 1995 and 72% in 
2003. According to the 2010 general census (FBSS 2012), 80.9% of the popu-
lation defined themselves as Russians. The largest ethnic group was the Tatars 
(3.9%), while the Ukrainians (1.4%) and the Bashkirs (1.2%) placed second 
and third. Using publically available data on the ethnic self-identification of 
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MPs, the proportion of these ethnic minorities in the Russian parliament did not 
match that of the general population. Between 1993 and 2003, the Tatars and 
Bashkirs accounted for 1.8 and 1% of MPs respectively. In contrast, Ukrainians 
have been clearly overrepresented in the State Duma, accounting for 5.9% of 
the members. The Belorussians were also overrepresented as they accounted 
for 1.5% of the parliamentarians and only 0.4% of the population (FBSS 2012). 
Ethnic minorities were, however, well represented among governors (38%) 
and among cabinet ministers (approximately 37%). The majority of governors 
with ethnic background ruled the so-called ethnic regions (republics and 
autonomous regions). Knowledge of local conditions and wide networks were 
likely important for election to this high-ranking executive position (compare 
Francis and Kenny 2000). 
Age Structure of Elites 
The elites of the Soviet Union are often described as gerontocratic. However, 
this is only true for the later periods of the Soviet Union. The Bolshevik elite 
who gained power in 1917 was young; the average age was 33 years (Mawd-
sley and White 2000, 15). They had joined the Bolshevik Party before 1917 
and were politically active during the Civil War (Mawdsley and White 2000, 
54). In 1917-1934, CC elite in their thirties and early forties had the best oppor-
tunities for career advancement. 
The elites recruited to the CC in the later years of Stalin’s rule were even 
younger than the Bolsheviks (Mawdsley and White 2000, 247). The average 
age of elites under Khrushchev, however, was as high as 50 years, although 
“the median member in 1961 was still in his thirties and the median member of 
the wider society was in his twenties” (Mawdsley and White 2000, 250). 
Under Brezhnev’s rule, the elites could be considered gerontocratic. The av-
erage age of the CC members was 62 years by 1981. Compared to the CC 
elites, the People’s Congress delegates were considerably younger; only 10% 
of the delegates were over 60 (Mawdsley and White 2000, 250). “The ageing 
of the Central Committee was not simply a result of the fact that the continuing 
membership was becoming more elderly; it was a result even more directly of 
the increasing age of new members” (Mawdsley and White 2000, 170). The CC 
members were also older than rank-and-file members (13% over 60) and the 
total population (less than 20% were over 60) (Mawdsley and White 2000, 
253). 
Under Gorbachev, many older elites were dismissed in favour of younger 
members (Hanley et al. 1995, 647). Thus, the average age of CC members fell 
from 58 years in 1986 to 49 years in 1990 (Mawdsley and White 2000, 253). 
While in 1988, 22% of nomenklatura members were over 60, this percentage 
decreased to approximately 13% by 1993 (Hanley et al. 1995, 653). 
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In post-Soviet Russia (1991 until 2011), the average age of ministers and 
MPs was 47 years and had increased for both groups; for cabinet ministers it 
increased from 46 years in 1991 to almost 51 years in 2011, and for parliamen-
tarians from 45 years in 1993 to 50 years in 2007. The development of the age 
structure of political elites supported expectations with regard to the regime 
changes. The fact that the post-Soviet political elites were younger than those 
under Gorbachev revealed massive changes in political personnel. The lower 
echelons of the nomenklatura were presented with the opportunity to obtain 
higher positions after the collapse of Communism and many of them took it 
(Kryshtanovskaya and White 1996; Lane 1997). The average age of incum-
bents has increased, thereby increasing the average age of political elites. An-
other finding is the increasing age of newcomers to the elite, which corre-
sponds to the average age of the elites minus approximately one year. This 
tendency indicates a stabilisation of the recruitment pool and matches the 
Western European pattern (Best 2007). In Western Europe, political parties do 
not specifically select candidates with particular personal characteristics, al-
though candidates with high socio-economic status are often preferentially 
recruited to elite positions (Gallagher and Marsh 1988). Candidates between 45 
and 50 years old have usually graduated from universities and accumulated 
different types of capital (e.g., financial, political and networks). This group is 
attractive for selectorates and electorate alike. 
Highly Educated Elites 
The Bolsheviks promoted equal rights and increased opportunities for the 
working class and peasantry in all spheres of life. The Soviet government sub-
stantially contributed to the increase in the literacy rate of the total population. 
While approximately 30% of the total population had a basic education at the 
end of the 19th century, by 1926 almost 61% of the population had received 
some basic education, and illiteracy was virtually eliminated by 1989 (Pa-
chinzeva et al. 2003). The proportion of university students increased from ten 
students per 10.000 in 1914 to 206 students per 10.000 in 1985-1986 (Pa-
chinzeva et al. 2003). The increase in the educational level of the general popu-
lation might be explained by the expansion of the educational system in the 
Soviet Union. 
The educational level of Soviet elites was, however, always higher than that 
of the general population. In the early years, the top leaders of the Soviet Union 
were particularly well-educated (Mosse 1968). Pipes (1994, 495-500) even 
described them as “the intellectuals”. This perception was partly true; indeed, 
40% of the CC members in 1917-1923 had obtained a university degree, while 
another 33% had received some secondary education (Mawdsley and White 
2000, 17). Compared to the top leaders of the Soviet Union and CC members, 
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only 5% of the Communist rank-and-file members in 1925 had attended uni-
versity (Mawdsley and White 2000, 246). 
The Bolshevik elites of 1917-24 were often contrasted to the later genera-
tions of Soviet politicians, who were considered to be low-educated “organisers 
and administrators” (Mosse 1968). From the perspective of formal qualifica-
tion, the proportion of CC members with a university degree had increased 
from 40% to almost 50% by the mid-1930s, while the proportion of members 
with secondary education remained the same (Mawdsley and White 2000, 55). 
In the same period, only 10% of the delegates for Congresses of People’s 
Deputies had studied at a university, while another 31% of delegates had re-
ceived secondary education (Mawdsley and White 2000, 55). 
The Soviet elites in the late Stalin years were even better educated than the 
Bolshevik elites. More importantly, a dominance of elites with technical educa-
tion in the Soviet politics originated in the 1930s (Farmer 1992, 207-10; Fitz-
patrick 1979). Industrialisation increased the demand for graduates with de-
grees in the technical and natural sciences. This demand was primarily satisfied 
by a “fast-track” education in these areas. “Most famous were the ‘thou-
sanders’, individuals benefiting from organized recruitment by the central 
authorities and trade unions and sent to engineering, agriculture, education, and 
military institutes, with the emphasis now on very rapid education, in keeping 
with the tempo of the Five Year Plan” (Mawdsley and White 2000, 114; also 
Hanley et al. 1995, 642). Most importantly, the well-educated technocrats 
(Fitzpatrick 1979, 204) preferred to stay in academia or production rather than 
move into politics (Bailes 1978, 431-41). During the 1930s, a system of voca-
tional education for prospective elite members was established through the 
rabfaks (workers faculties) and these became increasingly popular (Mawdsley 
and White 2000, 249). 
The rise in educational status and the ‘technocratisation’ of Soviet elites 
were even more intense under Khrishchev and Brezhnev. 24% of Peoples’ 
Congress delegates had received a technical degree by the end of the 1950s, 
and this proportion increased to 94% in 1981 (Mawdsley and White 2000, 114, 
173). Generally, an educational degree in the technical or natural sciences 
became a prerequisite for a position in the Soviet party or state apparatus. At 
the same time, the ‘cadre stability’ policy introduced by Brezhnev forced many 
prospective party or state candidates to remain in academia or production (Han-
ley et al. 1995, 645). 
Under Gorbachev, the proportion of university graduates among Soviet el-
ites continued to increase (Hanley et al. 1995, 655). Approximately 70% of the 
elites had attended university (Mawdsley and White 2000, 206). The tendency 
towards technical education remained; more than 70% of the Soviet nomenkla-
tura studied technical or administrative studies at universities, while only 25% 
were educated in the humanities (Hanley et al. 1995, 655). In comparison to the 
late Soviet nomenklatura, even more members among the 1993 elites had ob-
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tained a technical education (approximately 86%), while less had obtained a 
degree in the humanities (some 10%) (Hanley et al. 1995, 655). 
The educational level of political elites has continued to increase after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Over the four parliaments, an average of 96% of 
parliamentarians had obtained a university degree, and all cabinet ministers 
between 1991-2011 and all governors between 1991-2010 had at least one 
university degree. It is not surprising that political elites are better educated 
than the general population and rank-and-file members (Coleman and Azrael 
1965), but the magnitude of highly educated recruits is still impressive. A uni-
versity degree has become a de facto prerequisite for obtaining any elite posi-
tion. 
Hanley et al. (1995, 655) suggested that  
the deinstitutionalisation of the Communist Party in all probability eliminated 
channels that once allowed politically loyal individuals with little technical 
training to advance into positions of managerial authority. The demise of the 
Party appears to have closed off entry into the elite for all except those with 
some form of technical training. 
It is of interest to evaluate whether the educational trends identified have per-
sisted and are still applicable to the elites of post-communist parliaments. 
As with the Soviet elites, the largest proportion of parliamentarians had re-
ceived a degree in the technical and natural sciences, engineering, or medicine. 
They represented between 51% (first term) and 56% (fourth term) of post-
communist MPs. The popularity of an education in social sciences, humanities, 
and economy has boomed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Approxi-
mately 42% of Russian MPs had studied in these fields, and their proportion 
has increased over post-Communist period. The lowest proportion of MPs 
attained a law degree (i.e., an average of 14% over four legislative terms) and 
this proportion has gradually decreased over time. With regard to education, 
Russian MPs differ from their West European counterparts of whom the major-
ity had studied economics, social sciences, and humanities (Gaxie and Godmer 
2007, 119-123). 
Law graduates represented the lowest proportion of ministers and governors 
(roughly 13 and 5% respectively). Approximately 35% of governors and nearly 
30% of ministers studied economics or another social science. Almost the same 
proportion of ministers studied engineering or a natural science, including 
medicine, and more than one half of governors held a degree in engineering. 
Historical continuities may also be observed in the educational profile of 
post-Soviet political elites. Technocrats remained the dominant group both 
among the parliamentarians and governors. The educational profile of ministers 
has included both social and technical sciences, which may be explained by the 
high degree of specialisation. 
In general, the average member of the Soviet and post-Soviet political elite 
was male, an ethnic Russian, middle-aged, and highly educated. The slight 
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differences among elite subgroups were the consequences of different selector-
ates and selection criteria. The analysis reveals the structural similarities be-
tween Soviet and post-Soviet political elites with regard to their socio-
demographic profiles. This finding underlines the low social mobility of certain 
groups. From the perspective of structural reproduction, the question of indi-
vidual reproduction arises, i.e., whether former Soviet politicians remained in 
politics. 
Individual Reproduction of Soviet Elites.  
Parliamentarians as a Case Study 
An analysis of Soviet political experience showed that hardly any post-Soviet 
politicians had been open opponents of the Soviet regime. Approximately 40% 
of post-Soviet ministers had held a national-level rank in the Soviet nomenkla-
tura, and more than half had played some regional political role during the 
Soviet period. Similarly, more than 60% of governors had held a high-ranking 
position at the local or regional level during the Soviet period, while approxi-
mately 26% were members of the national nomenklatura. Over the four parlia-
ments, one third of MPs had held a high position at the local and regional level. 
One quarter of MPs had held a party leadership position in the CPSU. Ap-
proximately 3% of post-Soviet MPs had held a ministerial position in the So-
viet Union. Almost 15% of MPs had been former Soviet parliamentarians and 
17% had held a national nomenklatura position. Both proportions decreased 
over time. 
It is evident that the circulation of political elites was incomplete, as many 
post-Soviet politicians belonged to the Soviet ruling class. Therefore, it is im-
portant to assess the effect of Soviet political experience on an individual’s 
chances of surviving in post-Soviet Russia. For this purpose, the careers of 
Russian MPs were studied using logistic regression. The dependent binary 
variable indicated whether an MP belonged to the group of long-standing MPs 
(i.e., those who had served three or more legislative terms). The independent 
variables included types of Soviet political experience and the occupational 
experience of MPs. Socio-demographic characteristics of MPs were used as 
control variables. 
In general, the more political experience an MP had gained during Soviet 
era, the higher the chance of remaining in the State Duma for three or more 
terms. MPs with a high degree of Soviet political experience had a 1.3 times 
greater chance of becoming incumbents. Specifically, former national nomenk-
latura members had a 1.8 greater chance of serving in the Russian parliament 
for three or more terms. In general, former national nomenklatura members had 
often gained leading experience in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in 
Soviet governments (r=0.15, p<0.000) and in Soviet quasi-parliaments (r=0.22, 
p<0.000). 
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An occupational background in business, however, decreased the chances of 
staying in parliament for three or more terms by 1.4 times. Incumbent MPs 
recruited from business gained more experience at the regional level and in the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union than MPs with other occupational back-
grounds. In contrast, they had seldom held any national nomenklatura posi-
tions. 
The analysis of parliamentary incumbency based on personal characteristics 
of MPs corresponds with the existing body of literature. Former Soviet politi-
cians survived the collapse of Communism and adapted to the new conditions 
(Kryshtanovskaya and White 1996). The most successful politicians were those 
who had held positions at the national level (e.g., ministry departments and 
party apparatuses). These positions allowed for the development of expertise in 
a certain area and required party loyalty. Furthermore, the majority of national 
nomenklatura members had gained other types of experience, thereby increas-
ing the degree of their specialisation, their political knowledge, and network 
accumulation. These people built the backbone of the Soviet parliament and 
contributed to the direction in which Russian parliamentarism has developed 
(Remington 2001). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these politicians 
apparently preferred to move to parliament, rather than business. This finding 
is supported by the fact that MPs recruited from business had seldom gained 
national nomenklatura experience. 
In Russia, parliamentary work is less attractive than work in the economic 
sphere. This is not only due to financial differences between salaries in politics 
and economy, but also to the declining role of the parliament in the Russian 
political system. During the 1990s, the parliament was a place for intense de-
bates between the Lefts (who controlled parliament) and pro-presidential 
forces. The end of Yeltsin’s presidency was marked by the appointment of 
Vladimir Putin, the victory of the pro-presidential party “Unity (Bear)” and the 
pro-government party “Fatherland-All Russia”, and low public support for 
oppositional parties with liberal ideologies. The 2003 parliament elected under 
Putin had already been dominated by the new party “United Russia”, which 
was built by merging the “Unity” and “Fatherland-All Russia” as well as MPs 
from other parliamentary groups. Since then, the role of parliament has sub-
stantially decreased. The strategy of “United Russia” to recruit celebrities via 
their party list has also contributed to the decrease in professionalisation and 
thus in the prestige of a parliamentary seat. 
In the early 1990s, no legal regulation and opportunities for institutional 
lobbying of business interests were provided for the emerging economical 
class. The economic developments of the early 1990s led to the coining of the 
term “Komsomol economy”, which refers to the young Soviet politicians (i.e., 
Komsomol members) who obtained the right to participate in business activi-
ties (Kryshtanovskaya and White 2005). Although the ‘Komsomol economy’ 
was under strict control of the Communist Party, it enjoyed great privilege, 
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while economic activities of all other social and political groups were prohib-
ited by law. Deposit auctions (i.e., a scheme used for the privatisation of big 
enterprises in the early 1990s) helped turn former Komsomol members into 
oligarchs. 
The political power of economic conglomerates was the highest during the 
two presidential terms of Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999), during which they partici-
pated in decision-making and formed political landscape by organising parties 
and movements across the ideological spectrum (Krystanovskaja 2004). In the 
media, the second Yeltsin term was often referred to as “semibankirshchina”, 
i.e. the power of seven bankers who greatly contributed to the re-election of the 
president. 
Legal regulations of economic activities, tax payments for enterprises that 
were privatised in the 1990s, and the arrest and following trial of Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky (one of the oligarchs) are all factors contributing to the reduced 
role of economic elites in the decision-making process after Putin’s election, 
although the influence of Putin’ clan (i.e., businessmen and state officials af-
filiated with the president) should have increased (Kosals 2007). 
In general, the representation of businessmen in parliament increased 
throughout the post-Soviet period. In 2003, approximately 44% of MPs had an 
occupational background in business. The largest proportion of MPs with a 
business background was recruited by the pro-presidential parties. In single-
member districts they were recruited as independent MPs. Due to party switch-
ing, the pro-presidential party, “United Russia”, had an increased proportion of 
businessmen (50%) in 2003. In Russia, businessmen generally aim for prox-
imity to power elites, especially the president. The only difference is that under 
Yeltsin, entry channels to the president were more open, while under Putin’s 
policy of ‘equal distancing’, many businessmen had to use an intermediate 
channel, the “United Russia”. 
In summary, individual reproduction was prominent. These findings partly 
correspond to the existing research (Szelényi and Szelényi 1995). In contrast to 
the expectations formulated by Szelényi, we also found some circulation of 
elites as some nomenklatura members were excluded from the new political 
class. The analysis showed that intra-elite circulation occurred (e.g., national 
nomenklatura members moved to parliament, while former local and regional 
politicians switched to business or state bureaucracy). If a relationship between 
political experience and survival chances exists, it would be interesting to in-
vestigate whether different elite sub-groups preferred different career paths. 
Continuities in the Career Paths of Political Elites 
The Bolshevik elites were generalists. Elite members working at the national 
level were usually reassigned to the regional level, and then back again. Cross-
overs between party and state apparatus positions were also widespread during 
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the 1920s and 1930s. The nomenklatura system, which would regulate the 
political and state careers of millions, originated in this period of Soviet history 
(Farmer 1992; Harasymiw 1969). 
The increasing complexity of political and party institutions was accompa-
nied by a decreased demand for generalists. The elites of the CC became more 
specialised in the late 1930s. At the same time, crossover between ministerial, 
territorial party, and military positions substantially decreased (Mawdsley and 
White 2000, 102). For example, “taking the late Stalinist elite as a group, there 
were only three cases of territorial party secretaries moving to state ministerial 
posts, and apparently no cases of change in the other direction” (Mawdsley and 
White 2000, 102). At the end of Stalin’s rule, the majority of military leaders 
had attended specialised academies and collected wartime experience, while 
the typical career paths of state ministers involved specialised technical training 
and practical experience in factories or lower-level positions in related minis-
tries. In contrast, the territorial party secretaries had seldom obtained special-
ised education, “although their main experience had been at this same, republic 
or regional, level” (Mawdsley and White 2000, 102-3). 
During Brezhnev’s rule, recruitment to the nomenklatura followed a pattern 
of “vertical promotion within a single institutional arena” (Hanley et al. 1995, 
649). Crossover between party and state positions was often at the regional 
level, although this tended to inhibit career advancement (Farmer 1992, 198-9). 
Similarly, crossover between economic positions (e.g., enterprise directors and 
managers) and high-ranking state or party positions was relatively rare (Hanley 
et al. 1995, 649-50). 
Under Gorbachev, these channels of recruitment were not destroyed; rather, 
“vertical promotion within organisational hierarchies remained the modal route 
of entry into the elite” (Hanley et al. 1995, 650). Newly recruited nomenklatura 
members had usually occupied administrative positions below the nomenkla-
tura level within the state and party apparatuses or the state economy. For 
example, approximately 63% of the 1988 nomenklatura members had held 
similar positions in 1983; moreover, some 67% of them remained in the same 
institutional arena (Hanley et al. 1995, 651). Lateral movements increased 
under Gorbachev; some 33% of the 1988 nomenklatura, mainly the state enter-
prise directors, moved to the state bureaucracy. The nomenklatura members 
who switched from one institutional arena to another between 1983 and 1988 
also preferred to remain in the state apparatus (Hanley et al. 1995, 651). 
As in the Soviet Union, Russian executive bodies were predominantly 
formed via internal recruitment (Lane and Ross 1994, 20). The majority of 
post-Soviet cabinet ministers had held a high-ranking position (i.e., junior 
minister) in national ministries. Compared to the late Soviet period, however, 
the respective proportion of internally recruited ministers decreased, averaging 
55%. A position at the regional level in Russia was a springboard to a guberna-
torial position. Approximately 40% of governors were internally recruited 
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within regional governments, while another 37% had been elected from re-
gional parliaments. In contrast, less than 10% of parliamentarians were re-
cruited within the State Duma. 
In post-Soviet Russia, there were little crossover between cabinet and par-
liamentary careers. From 1991 to 2011, approximately 13% of cabinet mem-
bers were State Duma legislators, while only 7% of MPs had gained cabinet 
experience before their first election to parliament. Roughly 10% of cabinet 
ministers had prior experience in regional parliaments. Crossover between 
ministerial and gubernatorial careers was also seldom. Approximately one in 
six cabinet ministers had held a position in regional government before their 
appointment, while roughly 8% of governors were cabinet ministers before 
they were appointed to office. In contrast to a ministerial career, a gubernatorial 
career represents an integrated career path across the regional and national 
levels as well as between legislative and executive branches. It also connects 
parliamentary and gubernatorial positions. Approximately 30% of governors 
gained political experience in the national parliament (in the Council of Federa-
tion and the State Duma). 
An analysis of political careers over the post-Soviet period indicated conti-
nuity with the Soviet tradition of political specialisation. In an analysis of the 
political careers of administrative elites in the Soviet Union, Farmer (Farmer 
1992, 199) underlined that “frequent crossing over between party and state 
posts inhibits mobility... Careers destined for ultimate success tend to be con-
fined mainly to one channel or the other”. Post-Soviet political careers have 
differed in their degree of specialisation. The most distinct career path is one 
toward a cabinet position, which usually starts at the national level and includes 
work in ministries. This path also involves a high degree of internal promotion 
and a low degree of crossover between gubernatorial and parliamentary careers. 
A gubernatorial career, which usually starts at the regional level, also entails a 
relatively high level of internal recruitment. This career path involves more 
crossover than a cabinet career path, being particularly attractive for national 
MPs. A parliamentary career in the State Duma is quite obscure. Many MPs 
start their political careers directly upon election to parliament. This career path 
is unattractive for both former cabinet members and governors, and a negligible 
proportion of internally recruited candidates choose to follow it. 
The explanation of these developments includes many factors. Cabinet ca-
reers, being the most specialised of political careers, had not undergone many 
changes after the collapse of Communism. Although transition meant the end 
of careers for many Soviet ministers, the second line of ministerial employees 
were not greatly affected by the regime changes. Following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, administrative experience and expertise in certain areas facili-
tated a smooth transition for ministry employees. Specialisation was considered 
more valuable for a career within ministries than party loyalty. This assumption 
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is also supported by the fact that the majority of post-Soviet ministers were not 
party-affiliated. 
The high proportion of internally recruited candidates called into question 
the role of patronage in the advancement of ministerial careers. Recruitment 
systems that are more or less closed for external contenders are prone to the 
development of personal loyalties, which may be rewarded with career ad-
vancement (Farmer 1992). This results in the widespread promotion of less 
experienced, but loyal candidates, as well as the retention of ineffective elite 
members, which was evident in the Soviet nomenklatura system (Harasymiw 
1969). The analysis of ministerial appointments in Russia reveals an important 
role of the president in career advancement. President Boris Yeltsin appointed a 
large number of ministers with whom he had been personally familiar as a 
CPSU leader prior to 1989. Similarly, President Vladimir Putin appointed 
many contacts he had made while holding political positions in St. Petersburg 
during the 1990s; veterans of the St. Petersburg regional government built a 
noticeable group among post-Soviet ministers (approximately 10%), including 
former President Dimitri Medvedev. Furthermore, personal acquaintance with 
the president and the possibility of developing loyalties could be achieved 
through working in the presidential administration. Indeed, approximately 6% 
of ministers had gained this type of experience before their appointment to 
cabinet, while some 7% of ministers were appointed to the presidential admini-
stration at the end of their term. 
Being less specialised compared to a cabinet career, a gubernatorial career in 
post-Soviet Russia also followed the Soviet pattern. The majority of governors 
started and pursued their careers at the regional level. For this career path, 
presidential patronage was of greater importance than for a ministerial career 
because, after the collapse of Communism, governors of virtually all Russian 
regions were personally appointed by Boris Yeltsin. These appointments were 
only meant to be temporary and to help increase support for the president in the 
respective regions. The bulk of appointed governors, however, were able to 
accumulate electoral and political capital and win the first regional elections. 
As a rule, governors elected in the first years after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union remained in power for many terms. Although a gubernatorial career in 
post-Soviet Russia lasted an average of 6 years (i.e., 1.5 terms), some regional 
careers continued for more than 15 years (e.g., Yuriy Luzhkov in Moscow and 
Anatoliy Lisitsin in Yaroslavskaya Oblast). The tenure of governors in the so-
called ethnic regions was even longer (e.g., Mintimer Shaymiyev served 19 
years in the Tatarstan Republic; Kirsan Ilyumzhinov served approximately 18 
years in the Kalmyk Republic; and Murtaza Rakhimov served 17 years in the 
Bashkortostan Republic). In 2004, however, gubernatorial elections were abol-
ished by President Vladimir Putin, thereby ending many long-term careers and 
changing the structure of opportunities for regional elites. The candidates for a 
gubernatorial seat are now selected by the president and recommended to the 
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regional parliament, which votes for the proposed candidates. The patronage 
power of the head of the state has even increased through these measures. Now, 
the president may not only indirectly appoint governors, but he also possesses 
the power to dismiss his appointee, and is only required to provide vague justi-
fications such as ‘breach of trust’. 
Finally, parliamentary careers in post-Soviet Russia were rather episodic. 
The Congresses of People’s Deputies and the Supreme Soviets were powerless 
and unprofessional bodies; the majority of deputies worked part-time, parlia-
mentary groups were built on the territorial principle and not on the party basis, 
and standing committees were less specialised (Remington 2001). Therefore, a 
professional, full-time legislative career had to be built from the ground up. Of 
course, there has been a group of politicians who had gained some political 
experience before their elections to parliament and possess specific expertise. 
These professional politicians built a mainstay of MPs with three or more man-
dates and had often served on a particular committee without any changes. A 
modest 30% of MPs had held some kind of party position before entering par-
liament, and this proportion was stable throughout the post-Soviet period. 
Moreover, approximately the same proportion of MPs had gained some politi-
cal experience at the local or regional level, while one in six MPs were politi-
cally active as regional parliamentarians before their election to the State 
Duma. The bulk of post-Soviet MPs, however, were political novices. They 
easily entered parliament and also easily left to other job sectors, primarily 
business (Semenova 2011). The high volatility of political personnel, wide-
spread party switching (it was forbidden before the 2007 elections), frequent 
re-organisation of parliamentary party groups, and the constant increase in the 
number of standing committees are all factors that hindered the professionalisa-
tion of parliamentary elites. Patronage also played a role in legislative career 
advancement, but the main patrons were the pro-presidential parties that were 
installed in every electoral term. These parties attracted MPs from all other 
party groups, but primarily independent parliamentarians elected in single-
member constituencies. In general, the role of parliament has decreased over 
time and it has been controlled by pro-presidential forces since 2003. A parlia-
mentary career path, which had to be planned after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, has developed into a short-term option for politicians with specific and 
particular interests. From this viewpoint, a parliamentary career in post-Soviet 
Russia had some similarities to that of the Soviet period. Both were short-lived, 
had a nominal character (the former Speaker of the State Duma, Boris Gryzlov, 
said that the parliament is not a place for debates, but for professional work) 
and were less attractive compared to other career paths, both inside and outside 
of political sphere. 
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Conclusion 
The development of political elites in post-Soviet Russia was path-dependent. 
We identified a partial reproduction of the political elite. This type of reproduc-
tion may be defined as reproduction circulation, which is “positionally narrow 
and socially shallow in scope, but gradual and peaceful in mode” (Higley and 
Lengyel 2000, 5). With respect to its scope, it is narrow because the high-
ranking persons were primarily replaced, while fewer personnel changes were 
made within a wide range of lower positions. It is socially shallow because no 
great changes occurred in the social profiles of elites after the end of Commun-
ism. 
It would be interesting to investigate why these path dependencies survived 
the end of the Soviet Union, although the institutional framework has changed 
and a pronounced amount of newcomers entered the political sphere. We found 
three forms of path dependency. The first form is structural reproduction that is 
evident in continuities of the socio-demographic profile of political elites. The 
average member of the Soviet and post-Soviet political elite was male, an eth-
nic Russian, middle-aged, and highly educated. The slight differences among 
elite subgroups, i.e. cabinet members, parliamentarians and governors, were the 
consequence of different selectorates and selection criteria. The structural re-
production indicates low social mobility and strong social stratification in Rus-
sia. These continuities also might be rooted in Russian political culture as the 
disadvantages of certain social groups had persisted over decades of Soviet 
domination and throughout post-Soviet period. 
The second-strongest form of path dependency is functional reproduction 
that was found in career paths of political elites. Cabinet careers were the most 
specialised and were required to gain administrative experience and expertise 
in certain areas before appointment. Because of the noticeable proportion of 
internally recruited candidates, ministerial career paths were prone to the de-
velopment of personal loyalties, particularly presidential patronage. In com-
parison to cabinet career paths, a gubernatorial career was less specialised and 
pursued at the regional level. Presidential patronage was of greater importance 
than for cabinet careers, and it has even increased after the abolishment of 
gubernatorial elections in 2004. Parliamentary careers in post-Soviet Russia, 
however, were rather episodic. The bulk of post-Soviet MPs entered the par-
liament without any political experience and they remained for only a short 
period. For MPs, the pro-presidential parties played the role of the major pa-
tron. 
An analysis of career continuities did not support our expectations with re-
gard to re-establishment of nomenklatura selection mechanisms in post-Soviet 
period. It showed, however, that functional equivalents to the nomenklatura 
system were applied and they shaped the career paths of political elites, par-
ticularly those of cabinet and gubernatorial bodies. The major aim of these 
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functional equivalents is to secure patronage principles of the formation of 
political elites. 
Finally, individual reproduction was prominent. In general, the more politi-
cal experience MPs had gained during Soviet era, the higher the chances of 
becoming incumbents. Former national nomenklatura members had the best 
chances of staying in the State Duma for three of more terms, while an occupa-
tional background in business substantially decreased the chances of becoming 
a long-standing MP. The analysis showed that intra-elite circulation occurred 
(e.g., national nomenklatura members moved to parliament, while former local 
and regional politicians switched to business or state bureaucracy). The Soviet 
political elite sometimes experienced inter-elite positional changes in order to 
survive. Some elite members did not find a suitable position and were ex-
cluded. This type of reproduction is the least strong and less persistent. Al-
though it represents the result of selection process and occurs within the specif-
ic institutional framework, it is dependent on the resources of a certain person 
(e.g., finance, specific knowledge, or a specific position within political net-
works). Consequently, this reproduction should decrease over time, while func-
tional and structural reproduction are likely to remain. 
Further research on the survival of cabinet members and governors will con-
tribute to a better understanding of how Soviet political experience affects the 
career duration of political elite sub-groups. With regard to patronage and its 
role in the shaping of political careers, network analysis of political elites is the 
best method. 
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